Bleeding Kansas and Iraq

Interesting segment on The NewsHour with Jim Lehrer a couple of weeks ago. James Woolsey, a former CIA director during the Clinton administration, compared the sectarian violence currently going on in Iraq to Bleeding Kansas. As far as historical analogies go, I’d say this one is fairly accurate. I’m usually not a fan of comparing contemporary affairs to historical events because there’s always somebody out there who points out the shortcomings of the comparison, but divorced from the nineteenth-century political situation I’d say this one works well to contextualize the current state of civil violence that plagues our on-going operations there. The point is that Iraq is not in a civil war . . . yet. Just like Kansas in the1850s though, I’m afraid lines are beginning to harden as the opposing sides harden their agendas and continue to implement some John Brown vigilante justice on neutral parties forcing them to choose sides.

The strategic question of an Iraqi civil war though is much larger. If shots are fired on Sumter and sectarian violence does escalate into a broader civil war the question becomes, what impact will this have on our long-term strategic goals for the region? The answer, of course depends on the war’s outcome, presupposing that there is an eventual outcome, and who you are talking to. A “successful” outcome in the Bush administration’s eyes would almost surely involve the maintenance of Iraqi nationality with the country’s current border system preserved and some form of government in place. This would be the Lincoln end, or what actually occurred after Lee surrendered at Appomattox. Other viewpoints favor the Jefferson Davis view of partition, probably the more likely result if the Iraqi conflict becomes protracted. In Barnettian strategic terms, if the former occurs and U.S. forces remain, we’re back to square one, still working to “connect” Iraq economically but with a significant more amount of treasure spent and blood spilled. If the latter takes place, and you believe Thomas Barnett, who continuously argues that a partitioned Iraq would not be a significant setback, I guess it’s still more of the same, only now you’ve got three governments to negotiate with instead of one. Geography however, seems to be against Dr. Barnett on this one. A divided Iraq, partitioned along areas of Sunni, Shi'a, and Kurdish concentration would yield three separate countries. The Shi'a and Kurds, living in the North, East, and South, would have access to vast oil reserves while the Sunnis, confined to Western Iraq, would be mainly left with desert, seriously handicapping economic progress in the region. Failed economies breed instability and instability breeds terrorism. Thus a partition of Iraqi would offer U.S. policy a significant setback, so let’s hope Beauregard keeps his guns silent this time.