Revolt of the Generals?
So, I'm currently knee deep into writing my MA thesis on the "Revolt of the Admirals," the title of a 1949 newspaper article that described an interservice fight between the U.S. Navy and Air Force over the proper role of air power in the U.S. military. Even though I've stated that I don't like historical comparisons, the Revolt of the Admirals seemed especially relevant this week because of the retired military brass lining up against Secretary Rumsfeld.
The origins of the so-called "Revolt of the Admirals" began immediately after World War II but came to a boiling point in the years following the passage of the National Security Act of 1947. The Navy and Air Force favored the development of different weapon systems that would ensure that their service would be capable of delivering atomic weapons against the Soviet Union. The Navy sought to supplement its current carrier strength with a new heavy attack "super carrier" capable of carrying long-range strike aircraft that could deliver atomic weapons while the Air Force favored the development of the B-36 bomber, a propeller driven aircraft with intercontinental range. Anyway, long story short...James Forrestal, the first Secretary of Defense, had resigned and was replaced by Lewis Johnson, a hardened Air Force partisan. After only a month in office, Johnson canceled construction of the Navy's "super carrier," which had previously been approved by the President, without the Secretary of the Navy's consent. The Secretary of the Navy promptly resigned in protest and was replaced by a Johnson "yes-man." Fearing further cuts in naval aviation, an anonymous letter was leaked to Congress accusing the Secretary of Defense of profiting financially from the construction of the B-36 which instantly prompted hearings. Before the House Armed Services Commitee the Chief of Naval Operations and other leading Navy officers accused the Air Force and the Secretary of Defense of endangering national security by placing too much emphasis on the B-36, which one officer termed a "billion dollar blunder." After the hearings the CNO was promptly fired and many of the other naval officers who spoke out were also punished by Johnson.
There are of course many differences in the "Revolt of the Admirals"; and the ongoing dispute between Secretary Rumsfeld and the retired generals that are currently "revolting" against him. The obvious one is the status of the officers. The Revolt of the Admirals involved active naval officers who were called to testify before the House Armed Services Committee, they did not go to the press or write books to tell their story while the revolt was occurring. Currently all of these generals are retired personnel who are free to engage in public criticism. The problem though, as this anonymous editorial in the Washington Post correctly points out, is that several of these generals claim to speak for active service personnel which sets a dangerous precedent that could threaten to undermine the civilian control of the military. If the Secretary of Defense, which by the way is one of the most difficult positions in government, feels that he must please the military command to be effective, then we've lost civilian control, he could never accomplish anything. Speak for yourselves guys, let the active personel talk to SECDEF.
The problem with both of these revolts stems from an inability to listen, debate and compromise effectively. In both cases arrogance abounds on all sides. In 1949 the Navy leadership felt that the Secretaries of Defense and Navy had a reckless agenda and refused to work with them. Conversely the Air Force and service secretaries refused to listen to legitimate Navy fears and, as a result, carrier aviation was severely weakened which almost proved disastrous in the opening months of the Korean War. It seems Rumsfeld also displays a bit of this my-way-or-the-highway type management of the Pentagon which, if this is accurate, is not a healthy environment to formulate effective policy decisions. As John Nagel argues in Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife successful and effective military policy must be created within an environment that is conducive to learning. Commanders must feel that their opinions are being heard by the civilian leadership, and civilians must be open to good ideas as well as criticisms in order to formulate effective policy decisions. However, this exchange of ideas must take place within the military, the Secretary of Defense must be able to make controversial decisions without fearing reprisal from the military leadership. Both sides must adapt and weigh the national interest over their own individual loyalties and beliefs. The situation is too important, as it was in 1949, to let an arrogant and close-minded Pentagon stand in our way. Listen to your commanders Rumsfeld, encourage debate and the "revolts" will stop. On the other hand, if these boys did voice their opinions and were simply overruled by SECDEF, I'm afraid that's just tough shit. That's life in a civilian controlled military...get over it.
The origins of the so-called "Revolt of the Admirals" began immediately after World War II but came to a boiling point in the years following the passage of the National Security Act of 1947. The Navy and Air Force favored the development of different weapon systems that would ensure that their service would be capable of delivering atomic weapons against the Soviet Union. The Navy sought to supplement its current carrier strength with a new heavy attack "super carrier" capable of carrying long-range strike aircraft that could deliver atomic weapons while the Air Force favored the development of the B-36 bomber, a propeller driven aircraft with intercontinental range. Anyway, long story short...James Forrestal, the first Secretary of Defense, had resigned and was replaced by Lewis Johnson, a hardened Air Force partisan. After only a month in office, Johnson canceled construction of the Navy's "super carrier," which had previously been approved by the President, without the Secretary of the Navy's consent. The Secretary of the Navy promptly resigned in protest and was replaced by a Johnson "yes-man." Fearing further cuts in naval aviation, an anonymous letter was leaked to Congress accusing the Secretary of Defense of profiting financially from the construction of the B-36 which instantly prompted hearings. Before the House Armed Services Commitee the Chief of Naval Operations and other leading Navy officers accused the Air Force and the Secretary of Defense of endangering national security by placing too much emphasis on the B-36, which one officer termed a "billion dollar blunder." After the hearings the CNO was promptly fired and many of the other naval officers who spoke out were also punished by Johnson.
There are of course many differences in the "Revolt of the Admirals"; and the ongoing dispute between Secretary Rumsfeld and the retired generals that are currently "revolting" against him. The obvious one is the status of the officers. The Revolt of the Admirals involved active naval officers who were called to testify before the House Armed Services Committee, they did not go to the press or write books to tell their story while the revolt was occurring. Currently all of these generals are retired personnel who are free to engage in public criticism. The problem though, as this anonymous editorial in the Washington Post correctly points out, is that several of these generals claim to speak for active service personnel which sets a dangerous precedent that could threaten to undermine the civilian control of the military. If the Secretary of Defense, which by the way is one of the most difficult positions in government, feels that he must please the military command to be effective, then we've lost civilian control, he could never accomplish anything. Speak for yourselves guys, let the active personel talk to SECDEF.
The problem with both of these revolts stems from an inability to listen, debate and compromise effectively. In both cases arrogance abounds on all sides. In 1949 the Navy leadership felt that the Secretaries of Defense and Navy had a reckless agenda and refused to work with them. Conversely the Air Force and service secretaries refused to listen to legitimate Navy fears and, as a result, carrier aviation was severely weakened which almost proved disastrous in the opening months of the Korean War. It seems Rumsfeld also displays a bit of this my-way-or-the-highway type management of the Pentagon which, if this is accurate, is not a healthy environment to formulate effective policy decisions. As John Nagel argues in Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife successful and effective military policy must be created within an environment that is conducive to learning. Commanders must feel that their opinions are being heard by the civilian leadership, and civilians must be open to good ideas as well as criticisms in order to formulate effective policy decisions. However, this exchange of ideas must take place within the military, the Secretary of Defense must be able to make controversial decisions without fearing reprisal from the military leadership. Both sides must adapt and weigh the national interest over their own individual loyalties and beliefs. The situation is too important, as it was in 1949, to let an arrogant and close-minded Pentagon stand in our way. Listen to your commanders Rumsfeld, encourage debate and the "revolts" will stop. On the other hand, if these boys did voice their opinions and were simply overruled by SECDEF, I'm afraid that's just tough shit. That's life in a civilian controlled military...get over it.
posted by Will at 5:53 PM
0 Comments:
Post a Comment
<< Home