Return and Revision: Initial Thoughts on Bush and Iraq
Ok, I know I’ve been out of the loop for like three months but I needed to take a break during Law School crunch time and then unwind a little for the holidays before the grind started again. Now I’m back and there’s lots to discuss, we’ve gotten a new SECDEF, DNI, and supposedly as of tonight a new Counter-Insurgency (COIN) strategy for Iraq.
I plan to address Rumsfeld this weekend in a longer entry. The SECDEF position is one that is near and dear to me. I’ve had the distinct privilege to do some significant research in this area in the past so I’m looking forward to revisiting my old stomping ground, albeit in a fairly informal manner. However, tonight it’s Bush and Iraq.
My initial thoughts on the presidential address are, like everyone else I’m sure, those of scepticism. Yet, I was glad the president chose to speak to us from the White House Library, a civilian setting, rather than surrounding himself with military personnel which smacks of militarism. Bush was also much more mature, balanced and honest in his delivery of one of the better speeches of his presidency.
The “big news,” as we’ve been hearing for weeks, is a surge of 21,500 troops. What I was naively hoping for tonight was some sort of indication on the length of their deployment and the operational strategy that they will attempt to implement, which we didn’t get. A small surge of this magnitude in my humble opinion is just too little too late and too focused on Baghdad. We need AT LEAST 30,000 for an extended period with a significant deployment to Anbar to make any substantive change to the security situation on the ground. Security must be restored for an extended period by a conventional force, be it American or Iraqi, in order for reconstruction to go forward and discourage scores of unemployed Iraqis from turning to ethnic militias and terror groups; this will require an overwhelming force for an extended period. Yet with the Dems in power and in charge of the military purse-strings and a skeptical public I doubt we’ll see the extended deployment that we need.
I’m also a bit skeptical that this was the number recommended by the JCS. The JCS has continually denied the need for an increase in troop numbers under the rationalization that a troop surge will discourage the Iraqis from taking control of COIN operations because they will become over-reliant on US forces. This, in my opinion, is complete bullshit. How can Iraqi forces hope to grow into an effective combat force in a bloody insurgency/civil war without SIGNIFICANT US support and guidance? Americans need to realize that advice from the JCS is not always gospel. I would be much more interested in the number of troops a group of colonels and lt. colonels with on-the-ground-experience would recommend. That would give us a more accurate picture of the numbers required but colonels are never asked to make recommendations to senior civilian officials, a sad reality of careerism in today’s military.
Strategically we didn’t get much either. Nearly everything that was said concerns military operations but for COIN strategy political change is just as, if not more important than military operations. Currently the daily life of the average Iraqi, at least in Baghdad is miserable. They have no power, no security, no jobs, in some cases no sewage disposal, and live in constant fear of being blown to hell. We didn’t really hear anything about how the daily life of the average Iraqi will improve due to the increased troop numbers. NOTHING. And why didn’t we hear anything? Because the security situation has become so bad that reconstruction projects are unable to go forward effectively. Therefore MAJOR revision in the security situation are required before any substantive change can be made in the political realm and with an increase of numbers that is this small, little I am afraid will change.
I plan to address Rumsfeld this weekend in a longer entry. The SECDEF position is one that is near and dear to me. I’ve had the distinct privilege to do some significant research in this area in the past so I’m looking forward to revisiting my old stomping ground, albeit in a fairly informal manner. However, tonight it’s Bush and Iraq.
My initial thoughts on the presidential address are, like everyone else I’m sure, those of scepticism. Yet, I was glad the president chose to speak to us from the White House Library, a civilian setting, rather than surrounding himself with military personnel which smacks of militarism. Bush was also much more mature, balanced and honest in his delivery of one of the better speeches of his presidency.
The “big news,” as we’ve been hearing for weeks, is a surge of 21,500 troops. What I was naively hoping for tonight was some sort of indication on the length of their deployment and the operational strategy that they will attempt to implement, which we didn’t get. A small surge of this magnitude in my humble opinion is just too little too late and too focused on Baghdad. We need AT LEAST 30,000 for an extended period with a significant deployment to Anbar to make any substantive change to the security situation on the ground. Security must be restored for an extended period by a conventional force, be it American or Iraqi, in order for reconstruction to go forward and discourage scores of unemployed Iraqis from turning to ethnic militias and terror groups; this will require an overwhelming force for an extended period. Yet with the Dems in power and in charge of the military purse-strings and a skeptical public I doubt we’ll see the extended deployment that we need.
I’m also a bit skeptical that this was the number recommended by the JCS. The JCS has continually denied the need for an increase in troop numbers under the rationalization that a troop surge will discourage the Iraqis from taking control of COIN operations because they will become over-reliant on US forces. This, in my opinion, is complete bullshit. How can Iraqi forces hope to grow into an effective combat force in a bloody insurgency/civil war without SIGNIFICANT US support and guidance? Americans need to realize that advice from the JCS is not always gospel. I would be much more interested in the number of troops a group of colonels and lt. colonels with on-the-ground-experience would recommend. That would give us a more accurate picture of the numbers required but colonels are never asked to make recommendations to senior civilian officials, a sad reality of careerism in today’s military.
Strategically we didn’t get much either. Nearly everything that was said concerns military operations but for COIN strategy political change is just as, if not more important than military operations. Currently the daily life of the average Iraqi, at least in Baghdad is miserable. They have no power, no security, no jobs, in some cases no sewage disposal, and live in constant fear of being blown to hell. We didn’t really hear anything about how the daily life of the average Iraqi will improve due to the increased troop numbers. NOTHING. And why didn’t we hear anything? Because the security situation has become so bad that reconstruction projects are unable to go forward effectively. Therefore MAJOR revision in the security situation are required before any substantive change can be made in the political realm and with an increase of numbers that is this small, little I am afraid will change.
posted by Will at 8:10 PM
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