Saturday, August 19, 2006

Background on the Revolt Part I

Sometimes when I write I make the mistake of assuming that my readers know too much. A professor once told me that an "intelligent" peer should be able to pick up an academic paper and understand it. Therefore, difficult terms and foreign concepts should be defined and explained. However, I am not a very good judge of what an "intelligent" person is supposed to know.

I say all this as a disclaimer because it occurred to me that I needed to introduce my thesis topic if I'm going to be posting on it extensively and I'm not sure how accessible it will be to the average reader. Most of what I'll be writing will come directly from my thesis. If something doesn't make sense let me know because it probably needs correcting in my final draft. Also, my apoligees to the citation police. I've got no idea how to footnote in blogger but most of what I'll be writing about is original. In sections that draw heavily on sources I'll try to include some kind of citation. With that said, let's begin our education on the "Revolt of the Admirals."

On the week of October 17, 1949 readers of Time magazine found news on a civil-military relations feud in an article titled the “Revolt of the Admirals.” As the periodical’s opening act, the story spoke, in a somewhat sensationalist tone, of a U.S. Navy “outburst” before the House Armed Services Committee that finally brought the Navy’s “rebellion” into the public eye “with all the impressive might of a carrier strike.” The article’s release marked the culmination of an endless story that played itself out on the front pages of American newspapers, morning by morning, for over two weeks until “the revolt” finally came to a climax in the press on the opening pages of Time.

Yet, the events normally attributed to “the revolt of the admirals” began earlier that spring. By March 23, Secretary of Defense James Forrestal, a pro-Navy compromiser and former Secretary of the Navy, had been removed from office. The fiscal-minded Louis Johnson, a Truman political stooge rumored to have close ties with the newly created United States Air Force took his place. After only a month in office, Johnson canceled construction on the USS United States, a flush-deck aircraft carrier designed to operate aircraft capable of atomic delivery, without so much as a nod to the Secretary of the Navy, who was conveniently out-of-town, or the Chief of Naval Operations. John Sullivan, the Navy Secretary, immediately resigned in furious protest and fired off an angry letter castigating the Secretary of Defense for actions he deemed recklessly tragic. As a replacement for Sullivan Truman nominated Francis Matthews, a Johnson yes-man with absolutely no experience in naval affairs or Washington politics.

In early May an anonymous letter surfaced in the offices of several pro- Navy congressman. The document alleged serious improprieties had taken place in the Air Force’s procurement of the B-36, an intercontinental bomber about which many pilots had serious reservations, and accused Secretary Johnson and Air Force Secretary Stuart Symington of benefitting financially from its acquisition. Two sets of hearings were subsequently called by Congressman Carl “swamp fox” Vinson, the powerful chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, in order to substantiate the document’s claims and allow Navy officers to voice their opinions, which had long been simmering, on defense unification and national strategy.

The first set of hearings were a disaster for the Navy. The accusations made in the anonymous document quickly proved to have no basis in fact while Cedric Worth, a special assistant to Undersecretary of the Navy Dan Kimball, was exposed as the author of the letter, a serious public relations setback. Yet, under the leadership of the redoubtable Arthur Radford, the Navy soldiered on and, with their careers on the line, testified that Johnson’s defense policies were destroying naval aviation. Too much emphasis was being placed in war planning against the Soviet Union on the Air Force’s atomic blitz, they argued, an immoral method of warfare that could not assure victory. If these policies were allowed to continue, they warned, national security would be seriously jeopardized and the Navy would be torn apart.

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