Surging against the wind

At Intel Dump, Philip Carter points out a post written by Dave Kilcullen, an anthropologist and adviser to Gen Petraeus in Baghdad, on the Small Wars Journal Blog explaining the theory behind the current operational strategy in Iraq. It’s a must read:

These operations are qualitatively different from what we have done before. Our concept is to knock over several insurgent safe havens simultaneously, in order to prevent terrorists relocating their infrastructure from one to another, and to create an operational synergy between what we're doing in Baghdad and what's happening outside. Unlike on previous occasions, we don't plan to leave these areas once they’re secured. These ops will run over months, and the key activity is to stand up viable local security forces in partnership with Iraqi Army and Police, as well as political and economic programs, to permanently secure them. The really decisive activity will be police work, registration of the population and counterintelligence in these areas, to comb out the insurgent sleeper cells and political cells that have "gone quiet" as we moved in, but which will try to survive through the op and emerge later. This will take operational patience, and it will be intelligence-led, and Iraqi government-led. It will probably not make the news (the really important stuff rarely does) but it will be the truly decisive action.

When we speak of "clearing" an enemy safe haven, we are not talking about destroying the enemy in it; we are talking about rescuing the population in it from enemy intimidation. If we don't get every enemy cell in the initial operation, that's OK. The point of the operations is to lift the pall of fear from population groups that have been intimidated and exploited by terrorists to date, then win them over and work with them in partnership to clean out the cells that remain – as has happened in Al Anbar Province and can happen elsewhere in Iraq as well.

The "terrain" we are clearing is human terrain, not physical terrain. It is about marginalizing al Qa’ida, Shi’a extremist militias, and the other terrorist groups from the population they prey on. This is why claims that “80% of AQ leadership have fled” don’t overly disturb us: the aim is not to kill every last AQ leader, but rather to drive them off the population and keep them off, so that we can work with the community to prevent their return.

This is not some sort of kind-hearted, soft approach, as some fire-breathing polemicists have claimed (funnily enough, those who urge us to “just kill more bad guys” usually do so from a safe distance). It is not about being “nice” to the population and hoping they will somehow see us as the “good guys” and stop supporting insurgents. On the contrary, it is based on a hard-headed recognition of certain basic facts . . .

This is REALLY great stuff. Kilcullen’s post displays a welcome similarity to John Nagel’s Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife, one of the best works on counterinsurgency (COIN) available. It’s clear that the Petraeus crew, with its emphasis on community contact, Sunni alliance and police operations, is finally implementing an actual COIN strategy. The only problems here, again, are numbers, and more importantly, time.

Petraeus has to report on the operational effectiveness of "the surge" in September and unless significant "improvement" can be shown, in my humble opinion, Congress will cut funding and we’ll begin a significant drawdown in troop levels with possible redeployments to Kurdistan and a shift from active combat operations to passive advisory teams. Therefore, Petraeus has just under three months to acquire some modicum of "success" in order to convince the Congress to continue funding.

The problem is, that defining success in congressional terms will almost certainly be inconsistent with the COIN definition. A successful COIN strategy is measured in years. Operators must first create the necessary environment for a change in the Iraqi mindset and then convince the local population that THIS TIME it will be different by insuring security and fostering economic growth over the long-term. Economic growth, a factor that is vitally important for COIN operations, is, however, not something that can be measured in two months, it can take years before "success" is evident for the nearest politician or pundit to "measure."

Congress, rightly or wrongly in the typical Beltway fashion, will be defining success, if they are in actuality looking for it, through a micro mindset; they need tangible proof that the increase in boots is actually making a difference and that "the surge" is accomplishing something radically different from the previous ill-fated "clear and hold" operations. Therefore, even if these operations are being waged perfectly and are causing phenomenal successes, I don’t think these successes will be evident in the manner in which a Congress, gearing up for the presidential election, will require in order to continue funding a war the majority of Americans have turned against.

Hopefully, forces can be focused to exploit success in the recent offensives in Baquba and the "Baghdad Belts" and COIN operations can concentrate on these areas which can then be treated as microcosms for what American forces could possibly accomplish if given more time. Simply put, our only hope and America’s last best chance for success, lies with a man named Petraeus, the academics who surround him, and the military men and women commanded by him.

Godspeed boys and good hunting.

Our most hallowed ground

Great piece on All Things Considered yesterday concerning Arlington:

Arlington Visitors Should Dress for Hallowed Ground
by Bob Greene

You seldom see a necktie inside Arlington National Cemetery.

For that matter, you don't often see a dress.

I suppose that shouldn't seem so surprising. We live in a casual age; formality often seems not just endangered, but extinct.

And Arlington National Cemetery, especially in summer, can be very hot.

But somehow — as you spend time among the more than 300,000 souls who are buried in the cemetery near the Potomac River — you can't help feeling that we who visit can do a little better. If anyone has earned our decorum, it's those 300,000.

What do you see when you're there?

In Arlington National Cemetery you see women in cut-off blue jeans. You see young people walking past the headstones with their mouths moving to the songs being pumped into their ears by their iPods.

You see men in T-shirts with gag messages. One of the T-shirts I saw said: "The only reason I'm nodding is I hope you'll go away." Another — worn by a fellow in a cowboy hat — showed a picture of a handgun, accompanied by the words: "I don't call 9-1-1." A tough guy, apparently — amid the graves of some men who were truly tough.

There are cell phones everywhere. Next to the headstones of soldiers whose names you've never heard, next to the eternal flame of John F. Kennedy. People calling their offices, chatting with friends.

The odd thing is, they seem genuinely not to know they're being disrespectful. This is just another tourmobile stop — or so they seem to believe.

I mentioned that you seldom see neckties, seldom see dresses. There are times, though, when you do. They are worn by families who come to this place not as tourists — but to bury their own soldiers. Soldiers who have come home from our current war.

There are signs at the entrance. They say:

"Welcome to Arlington National Cemetery ... Our Nation's Most Sacred Shrine. Please Conduct Yourself with Dignity and Respect at All Times. Please Remember These Are Hallowed Grounds."

You wouldn't think we'd need reminding.

USAF REALLY wants gays in the military

Bit of a disturbance in the blogosphere this week concerning the Sunshine Project's discovery of an Air Force proposal to fund a chemical weapon designed to turn enemy soldiers into homosexuals. And the Pentegon has confirmed it!

This is just too good. According to a CBS affiliate:

Pentagon officials on Friday confirmed to CBS 5 that military leaders had considered, and then subsquently rejected, building the so-called "Gay Bomb."

Edward Hammond, of Berkeley's Sunshine Project, had used the Freedom of Information Act to obtain a copy of the proposal from the Air Force's Wright Laboratory in Dayton, Ohio.

As part of a military effort to develop non-lethal weapons, the proposal suggested, "One distasteful but completely non-lethal example would be strong aphrodisiacs, especially if the chemical also caused homosexual behavior."

The documents show the Air Force lab asked for $7.5 million to develop such a chemical weapon.

"The Ohio Air Force lab proposed that a bomb be developed that contained a chemical that would cause enemy soldiers to become gay, and to have their units break down because all their soldiers became irresistably attractive to one another," Hammond said after reviewing the documents.

"The notion was that a chemical that would probably be pleasant in the human body in low quantities could be identified, and by virtue of either breathing or having their skin exposed to this chemical, the notion was that soliders would become gay," explained Hammond.

The Pentagon told CBS 5 that the proposal was made by the Air Force in 1994."The Department of Defense is committed to identifying, researching and developing non-lethal weapons that will support our men and women in uniform," said a DOD spokesperson, who indicated that the "gay bomb" idea was quickly dismissed.

However, Hammond said the government records he obtained suggest the military gave the plan much stronger consideration than it has acknowledged.

"The truth of the matter is it would have never come to my attention if it was dismissed at the time it was proposed," he said. "In fact, the Pentagon has used it repeatedly and subsequently in an effort to promote non-lethal weapons,and in fact they submitted it to the highest scientific review body in the country for them to consider."

Military officials insisted Friday to CBS 5 that they are not currently working on any such idea and that the past plan was abandoned.

Putting all the WTF arguments aside for a second, Jason Sigger, a chemical weapons expert at Armchair Generalist points out that the "gay bomb" was not endorsed by DOD:

Yes, the DoD has, on occassion, desired to develop non-lethal chemical weapons
for special military applications (and in fact, the Air Force War College had a 2006 paper on it). But it's important to note that the proposal came out of the Air Force lab at Wright-Patt AFB - probably from a cash-starved and stupid government scientist, desperate for a grant to make it through the year. And let's just say that AF scientists have a history of proposing ridiculous ideas, because there's a lot of research money out there to be spent and it's better to spend money on dumb ideas than to risk getting less money the following year.

Well, I'm glad to know this was never officially considered by the Pentagon but I'm just wondering who the people were who were sitting around and decided to actually write this plan down on a sheet of paper and then what other asshat read the damn thing and decided "Wow, now THIS is an idea that needs to be funded."

WHAT . . . THE . . . FUCK?!!

Pace gets the boot, Navy to command

As of yesterday Secretary Gates has announced that he will not renominate General Pete Pace for a second term as JCS Chairman. According to DOD:

To avoid a contentious reconfirmation process, Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates will recommend that President Bush nominate Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Michael G. Mullen to replace Marine Gen. Peter Pace as chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

In a Pentagon news conference today, Gates said he also will recommend Marine Gen. James E. Cartwright for the position of vice chairman. Cartwright is the commander of U.S. Strategic Command. Navy Adm. Edmund P. Giambastiani Jr., the current vice chairman, announced his decision to retire last week.

“I have become well acquainted with Admiral Mullen over the last six months and believe he has the strategic insight, experience and integrity to lead America’s armed forces,” Gates said.

Gates said he intended to re-nominate Pace and Giambastiani but after consulting with senators of both parties came to the conclusions “that because General Pace has served as chairman and vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the last six years, the focus of his confirmation process would have been on the past rather than the future.”

He said the confirmation process would have the possibility of being quite contentious. “I am no stranger to contentious confirmations, and I do not shrink from them,” Gates said. “However, I have decided at this moment in our history, the nation, our men and women in uniform, and General Pace himself would not be well-served by a divisive ordeal in selecting the next chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.”

Pace will continue to serve as chairman until his term ends Sept. 30. He is the first Marine to hold the position.

This decision definitely comes as a shock. Pace has only served one term as chairman so this basically amounts to Pace being fired before serving a customary second term.

Several ways to look at this. First, change is good. Pace has served on the JCS as Chairman and Vice Chairman since 2001, which means he oversaw the invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan from their inception. Dems definitely paint him as a Rummy yes-man which would have hurt his confirmation hearing under Sen. Levin and his fellow boys in blue with Hillary hurling as many lightning bolts as possible. So this is probably a good political move by Gates to avoid severe criticism of policy decisions until Petraeus reports in September. Furthermore, Adm. Mullen is well-liked due to his current emphasis in naval circles on a 1000-ship navy which argues for intense international naval cooperation and, like Gates himself, will be a welcome change from the Rumsfeld crew.

Another perspective, as David Brooks pointed out last night on The NewsHour, is that Gates is dumping a trusted advisor by shying away from a winnable political fight. If Pace still has SECDEF's confidence then Gates should fight for him so-to-speak.
Failing to do so further illustrates the Administration's lack of political clout.

I usually agree with Brooks but I think he's missed the boat here. Gates is not concerned with loyalty and "winning" political battles in a normal partisan Washington sense as his predecessor was. This is Gates making a move that will better serve the country even if it means sacrificing Pace in the process. Again, well done Mr. Secretary.