Welcome to the World Artie

Interesting opinion piece this week from Arthur Schlesinger, a historian and former presidential advisor to President Kennedy. Whenever a “historian” ventures outside the confines of the ivory tower and utilizes historical analysis to comment on contemporary affairs for any medium, I’m always interested in what they have to say. In my opinion, the historical profession has been plagued in recent years by an ever-increasing lack of influence in government positions. This has occurred for many reasons, one of the main ones being that some historians view current events in past paradigms, a sort of if-it-worked-in-the-past-it-should-work-now mentality. This analytical shortcoming was glaringly evident in The Washington Post on Monday.

So here we have a little article by Schlesinger, which seems to parallel his book War and the American Presidency on the concept of preventive war throughout American history and the dangers of unilateralism. This kind of analysis is the reason why no one cares what historians have to say. Throughout the article, Schlesinger lists several historical events, his favorite of course being the Cuban Missile Crisis, where U.S. presidents refused to initiate preventive war. That’s fine, he’s essentially correct but he completely fails to demonstrate historical relevancy as he goes on:

[O]ur Cold War presidents kept to the Kennan formula of containment plus deterrence, and we won the Cold War without escalating it into a nuclear war. Enter George W. Bush as the great exponent of preventive war. In 2003, owing to the collapse of the Democratic opposition, Bush shifted the base of American foreign policy from containment-deterrence to presidential preventive war: Be silent; I see it, if you don't.

Hello! (bangs on Schlesinger’s apparently empty skull) wake-up buddy...(Schlesinger’s eyes slowly open)...(in soothing tone) hey how are you bud....you must have been asleep for awhile now...CAUSE THE FUCKING COLD WAR IS OVER!!! Jesus man, wake up! Containment and deterrence were engineered by Kennan to discourage aggression by the Soviet Union, it is not a trump card formula that will govern international relations until the end of time. It was constructed with a specific enemy in mind, an enemy that possessed its own unique social, political, and economic behavior which influenced how it conducted relations with the outside world. Engineering a grand strategy based on these same Cold War assumptions is dangerous because it encourages analysts to search for an enemy that does not exist, this is exactly why many in the Pentagon view China as a likely enemy. Furthermore, containment focuses on a nation state opponent that fortunately does not exist. Islamic extremism, our current enemy, possesses no national border or allegiance. Sticking to deterrence, as the H.W. Bush and Clinton administrations did, created an environment conducive to the growth of terrorism. Al Qaeda destroyed our marine barracks in Beirut, and we did nothing; they bombed the World Trade Center, and we did nothing; they bombed our embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, and we lobbed a few missiles into Sudan and Afghanistan; they attacked the USS Cole, and we did nothing, then, you guessed it...9/11.

Islamic extremism is a force that must be actively confronted or it will spread. People within these areas are seduced into terrorist networks because they have no real economic options. They live in poverty and have no way out. Logically they look for someone to blame for their circumstances and the U.S. and its allies become convenient target’s thanks to a healthy dose of encouragement from their local misguided Imam. If these same individuals are provided with an economic stake in society that gives them other options, then they are less likely to turn to a life of violence. Authoritarian regimes do not provide these incentives, which is why they have to be taken out. And since no other military possesses the flexibility that is needed to take down these regimes, it has to be us.

Containing the problem to the Middle East and the rest of the Third World will only breed further instability and cause a much greater problem down the line. Throughout the Cold War these areas were neglected and dictators encouraged, now we’re dealing with the results of that neglect: a bunch of pissed-off people with plenty of time and AK-47s on their hands just looking for a fight. Are we at fault here? You bet you’re ass we are but instead of pursuing an isolationist policy, pulling out and leaving these areas to their own fates, we’ve got to confront the problem. This is the price we pay for winning the Cold War.

Schlesinger, you’re just wrong. Events change, situations and relationships change, and instead of poking at the problem with the same old solution you’ve got to roll with the punches and adapt. New enemies call for new strategies and no one should know this better than a historian. His analysis is an insult to the profession and is exactly why no one cares what historians have to say anymore. Just because you’re a historian and study the past, doesn’t mean you have to live there.

A Military Historian Joins the Fight

Great piece by Max Hastings:

Behind the Revolt
The Generals' View: To the Micromanager Goes the Blame
The Washington Post
Wednesday, April 26, 2006; Page A25

The "generals' revolt" against Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld has provoked debate on both sides of the Atlantic about the proper boundaries of military protest. Many people who oppose the Iraq war and deplore Rumsfeld are nonetheless troubled by the notion of senior officers, even retired ones, openly criticizing political leadership.

But in truth, retired soldiers have always been outspoken about the alleged blunders of successor warlords, uniformed and otherwise. During Britain's colonial conflicts and in both world wars, through Korea and Vietnam, hoary old American and British warriors wrote frequently to newspapers, deploring this decision or that, exploiting their credentials to criticize governments and commanders.

During the Iraq campaigns of 1991 and 2003, I heard British chiefs of staff express their fervent desire for veterans to get themselves off television screens. We may assume that, as chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff today, Gen. Peter Pace feels the same way.

Winston Churchill's wartime chief of staff, Gen. Hastings "Pug" Ismay, charmingly described in his memoirs how, in 1940, lunches at his old army club in London became intolerable because at every mouthful, he was beset by veterans explaining how his master should properly be running the war. In self-defense, Ismay resorted to lunching at White's, a venerable aristocratic institution where few members had noticed that a conflict was taking place.

In the past, however, there was a clear demarcation between those issues for which governments were responsible in war -- high policy and the appointment of commanders -- and those of which generals were in charge: field operations. Administrations in the United States and Britain sometimes perished for starting the wrong wars or mismanaging the big issues -- Lyndon Johnson over Vietnam, Britain's Asquith government in 1916. When battles were lost, however, it was generals' heads that rolled, not politicians'.

Full article

Revolt of the Generals?

So, I'm currently knee deep into writing my MA thesis on the "Revolt of the Admirals," the title of a 1949 newspaper article that described an interservice fight between the U.S. Navy and Air Force over the proper role of air power in the U.S. military. Even though I've stated that I don't like historical comparisons, the Revolt of the Admirals seemed especially relevant this week because of the retired military brass lining up against Secretary Rumsfeld.

The origins of the so-called "Revolt of the Admirals" began immediately after World War II but came to a boiling point in the years following the passage of the National Security Act of 1947. The Navy and Air Force favored the development of different weapon systems that would ensure that their service would be capable of delivering atomic weapons against the Soviet Union. The Navy sought to supplement its current carrier strength with a new heavy attack "super carrier" capable of carrying long-range strike aircraft that could deliver atomic weapons while the Air Force favored the development of the B-36 bomber, a propeller driven aircraft with intercontinental range. Anyway, long story short...James Forrestal, the first Secretary of Defense, had resigned and was replaced by Lewis Johnson, a hardened Air Force partisan. After only a month in office, Johnson canceled construction of the Navy's "super carrier," which had previously been approved by the President, without the Secretary of the Navy's consent. The Secretary of the Navy promptly resigned in protest and was replaced by a Johnson "yes-man." Fearing further cuts in naval aviation, an anonymous letter was leaked to Congress accusing the Secretary of Defense of profiting financially from the construction of the B-36 which instantly prompted hearings. Before the House Armed Services Commitee the Chief of Naval Operations and other leading Navy officers accused the Air Force and the Secretary of Defense of endangering national security by placing too much emphasis on the B-36, which one officer termed a "billion dollar blunder." After the hearings the CNO was promptly fired and many of the other naval officers who spoke out were also punished by Johnson.

There are of course many differences in the "Revolt of the Admirals"; and the ongoing dispute between Secretary Rumsfeld and the retired generals that are currently "revolting" against him. The obvious one is the status of the officers. The Revolt of the Admirals involved active naval officers who were called to testify before the House Armed Services Committee, they did not go to the press or write books to tell their story while the revolt was occurring. Currently all of these generals are retired personnel who are free to engage in public criticism. The problem though, as this anonymous editorial in the Washington Post correctly points out, is that several of these generals claim to speak for active service personnel which sets a dangerous precedent that could threaten to undermine the civilian control of the military. If the Secretary of Defense, which by the way is one of the most difficult positions in government, feels that he must please the military command to be effective, then we've lost civilian control, he could never accomplish anything. Speak for yourselves guys, let the active personel talk to SECDEF.

The problem with both of these revolts stems from an inability to listen, debate and compromise effectively. In both cases arrogance abounds on all sides. In 1949 the Navy leadership felt that the Secretaries of Defense and Navy had a reckless agenda and refused to work with them. Conversely the Air Force and service secretaries refused to listen to legitimate Navy fears and, as a result, carrier aviation was severely weakened which almost proved disastrous in the opening months of the Korean War. It seems Rumsfeld also displays a bit of this my-way-or-the-highway type management of the Pentagon which, if this is accurate, is not a healthy environment to formulate effective policy decisions. As John Nagel argues in Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife successful and effective military policy must be created within an environment that is conducive to learning. Commanders must feel that their opinions are being heard by the civilian leadership, and civilians must be open to good ideas as well as criticisms in order to formulate effective policy decisions. However, this exchange of ideas must take place within the military, the Secretary of Defense must be able to make controversial decisions without fearing reprisal from the military leadership. Both sides must adapt and weigh the national interest over their own individual loyalties and beliefs. The situation is too important, as it was in 1949, to let an arrogant and close-minded Pentagon stand in our way. Listen to your commanders Rumsfeld, encourage debate and the "revolts" will stop. On the other hand, if these boys did voice their opinions and were simply overruled by SECDEF, I'm afraid that's just tough shit. That's life in a civilian controlled military...get over it.

The Post Goes for W's Throat

Don't have time to get into it right now but this little piece just pissed me off. STAY AWAY FROM HIS FAMILY YOU FUCKING BITCH!!! This is the kind of W-hating shit thatI just can't take. Go after his policies, go after his decisions, hell go after his intelligence, but leave the twins alone. What did they ever do to you?

You're Killin' Me Charles!

So, I’m reading my Washington Post yesterday and ran across this from Charles Krauthammer. Krauthammer’s a funny little cat. I was first exposed to him on PBS shortly after my accident in 2001 and therefore, being a fellow quadriplegic, was instantly interested in what this guy had to say. You never really know what you’re going to get with one of Krauthammer’s pieces. Sometimes I am completely enthralled with his pointed, well-reasoned opinion and yet on others he makes me realize why so many people hate Republicans so much. This little article, I’m sorry to say, falls into the latter category.

Immigration is obviously a big issue nowadays and I’ve been intending to do an entry on it but this little piece provided me with the kick in the ass that one often needs to get the ball rolling. So, here Krauthammer proposes the now famous radical right solution to our little immigration problem: build a fence. Somehow the word “fence,” I guess, is supposed to be less offensive than the word “wall” but a wall is really what it is. Charles softens up his audience by first proposing amnesty for the 11 million illegals that are already here and justifies building the “fence” as a way to calm the fears of those opposed to legalization:

My proposition is this: A vast number of Americans who oppose legalization and fear new waves of immigration would change their minds if we could radically reduce new -- i.e., future -- illegal immigration.
Forget employer sanctions. Build a barrier. It is simply ridiculous to say it cannot be done. If one fence won't do it, then build a second 100 yards behind it. And then build a road for patrols in between. Put in cameras. Put in sensors. Put out lots of patrols.

Holy shit . . . holy fucking shit . . . are you serious! Do you know how long the United States’s southern border with Mexico is? 1,951 miles!!! Let’s take a minute and let that sink in. That’s nearly the same distance from Knoxville, Tennessee to Los Angeles, California!!! Not only does Krauthammer proposes building TWO of these so-called “fences” but also a road for patrols, cameras, and sensors!!! Oh by the way, who’s going to man this 2000 mile monstrosity? I sure as hell know who’s gonna build it . . . the same people who build everything in this country: Latin American immigrants, most of whom are probably illegal!!! Hmmmm . . . how quickly we forget! But this isn’t even my favorite part of the piece, oh yes sports fans Krauthammer goes on:

Can't be done? Israel's border fence has been extraordinarily successful in keeping out potential infiltrators who are far more determined than mere immigrants. Nor have very many North Koreans crossed into South Korea in the past 50 years.

Oh, well now I feel better ‘cause the Korean and the Arab-Israeli relationships seem to be working out just fine . . . wake up and smell the fucking reality Charles!!! Not only are these "fences" mere fractions of the size that would be needed to "secure" our border, they also do little to establish long-term security. They are a simple solution that, if effective, provide short term border stability. Walls solve nothing, they only serve to antagonize. If you truly want to solve the immigration problem and create long-term security, you've got to work with our Latin American friends and create economic incentives there, so workers won’t feel like a mad dash to the United States is their only way out of death, disease, and poverty. Will this happen overnight? Not a snowball’s chance in hell. But it is the right thing to do and everyone, deep down, knows it. Big problems call for big solutions and until this kind of economic overhaul can be achieved for our sisters to the south, I’m fond of quoting that often repeated phrase, upon which this country was built but which now seems forgotten:

Give me your tired, your poor,
Your huddled masses yearning to breathe free,
The wretched refuse of your teeming shore.
Send these, the homeless, tempest-tost to me,
I lift my lamp beside the golden door.

Bleeding Kansas and Iraq

Interesting segment on The NewsHour with Jim Lehrer a couple of weeks ago. James Woolsey, a former CIA director during the Clinton administration, compared the sectarian violence currently going on in Iraq to Bleeding Kansas. As far as historical analogies go, I’d say this one is fairly accurate. I’m usually not a fan of comparing contemporary affairs to historical events because there’s always somebody out there who points out the shortcomings of the comparison, but divorced from the nineteenth-century political situation I’d say this one works well to contextualize the current state of civil violence that plagues our on-going operations there. The point is that Iraq is not in a civil war . . . yet. Just like Kansas in the1850s though, I’m afraid lines are beginning to harden as the opposing sides harden their agendas and continue to implement some John Brown vigilante justice on neutral parties forcing them to choose sides.

The strategic question of an Iraqi civil war though is much larger. If shots are fired on Sumter and sectarian violence does escalate into a broader civil war the question becomes, what impact will this have on our long-term strategic goals for the region? The answer, of course depends on the war’s outcome, presupposing that there is an eventual outcome, and who you are talking to. A “successful” outcome in the Bush administration’s eyes would almost surely involve the maintenance of Iraqi nationality with the country’s current border system preserved and some form of government in place. This would be the Lincoln end, or what actually occurred after Lee surrendered at Appomattox. Other viewpoints favor the Jefferson Davis view of partition, probably the more likely result if the Iraqi conflict becomes protracted. In Barnettian strategic terms, if the former occurs and U.S. forces remain, we’re back to square one, still working to “connect” Iraq economically but with a significant more amount of treasure spent and blood spilled. If the latter takes place, and you believe Thomas Barnett, who continuously argues that a partitioned Iraq would not be a significant setback, I guess it’s still more of the same, only now you’ve got three governments to negotiate with instead of one. Geography however, seems to be against Dr. Barnett on this one. A divided Iraq, partitioned along areas of Sunni, Shi'a, and Kurdish concentration would yield three separate countries. The Shi'a and Kurds, living in the North, East, and South, would have access to vast oil reserves while the Sunnis, confined to Western Iraq, would be mainly left with desert, seriously handicapping economic progress in the region. Failed economies breed instability and instability breeds terrorism. Thus a partition of Iraqi would offer U.S. policy a significant setback, so let’s hope Beauregard keeps his guns silent this time.

Defending Ole Pete

I’m currently TA’ing for “The Blue and the Gray” a military history of the US Civil War, the only military history class at Ole Miss. The course is taught by Dr. John R. Neff, author of Honoring the Civil War Dead, a department favorite among many students here, both graduate and undergraduate. I usually agree with Dr. Neff, and if I don’t at first, he usually wins me over with his remarkable ability to point out impracticality. However, there are a few areas where we do disagree and last week another one emerged.

The lecture topic for the day was the first and second day at Gettysburg. I should point out here that the Civil War is not an area where I specialize but is a topic that interests me and, as an undergraduate, I took every class offered on the Civil War era; whether or not this enables me to speak with some authority on the subject, I will leave to the reader. Our topic of disagreement centered around, surprise surprise, Lee’s relationship with Longstreet. Normally, the point of contention on this issue, among historians and the buff community, concerns the disagreement between Lee and Longstreet over the best plan to assault the Union position on the second day and why Longstreet took so long to get into a position to press the Union left in order to gain the Emmetsburg Road. However, this was not the point I found most troubling.

It was Dr. Neff’s contention, as I understood it, that there was never any dissension between Lee and Longstreet on this issue and Longstreet had simply made up this disagreement in his postwar memoirs to rescue his reputation. His point was that the Lee-Longstreet controversy at Gettysburg was a direct product of Longstreet’s memoir and his writings for the Southern Historical Society Papers, which were written during a storm of controversy as Longstreet tried to justify his wartime decisions to a hostile public that was furious with him for joining Lincoln’s Republican Party. According to Neff, Longstreet, like everyone else in the Army of Northern Virginia after Chancellorsville, believed Lee could do no wrong and agreed to implement his orders with little or no disagreement.

While I agree that Longstreet’s postwar views on the battle are biased and may not display an accurate account of “what actually happened,” I don’t think you can argue that Longstreet wasn’t dissatisfied with Lee’s plan of attack on the second day, the evidence simply isn’t there.

Faulting Lee’s failure at Gettysburg on Longstreet has its origins, mainly, in a speech given by Jubal Early at Washington and Lee University on 19 January 1872. Early, a leader of the Lost Cause coalition, sought to answer accusations made by Longstreet to a New York Times reporter that Lee’s Gettysburg strategy was flawed, by defending his commanding generals plans and accusing Longstreet of disobeying orders. Yet one of Early’s central accusations against Longstreet was that he did not give Lee’s plan enough support. If Longstreet had not disagreed, as Neff asserts, it would seem only logical that Early and his supporters would have pointed out that Longstreet was lying about his dissension in their indictments, instead of making it a central premise upon which their arguments were based. To my knowledge no one ever accuses Longstreet of lying about this point in the documents and simply claiming that we can’t trust Longstreet on this because his memoirs are flawed seems to be a bit of a stretch.

Longstreet did disagree with Lee at Gettysburg. As to the nature of this disagreement and how dissension influenced Longstreet’s decision-making on the second and third day is another matter and will not be argued here. I simply point out that the “Old Warhorse” was not happy with Lee’s strategy on those fateful days in Pennsylvania in early July, 1863 and to accuse him of lying on this point is a faulty and groundless accusation.