Petraeus to Stay in Iraq

General David Petraeus, Commanding General of Multi-National Force - Iraq, has decided to remain in command, at least until the fall. The Pentagon had asked Petraeus to consider moving to Europe as head of NATO but it appears he has decided to stay. Nadia Schadlow discusses this development in The Wall Street Journal. According to Schadlow:

What's depressing is that top political and military leaders in Washington asked him to consider the move in the first place. The proposal to shift Gen. Petraeus out of Iraq reflects the unwillingness of the military as a whole to make the larger cultural changes required to succeed in tough counterinsurgency missions.

Gen. Petraeus has repeatedly pointed out that a key reason behind the improvements in Iraq revolved around the fact that Americans were walking the streets, living alongside Iraqis, forging close relationships with Iraqi soldiers and police, and demonstrating to the population a commitment to achieving enduring security. Indeed, a key requirement for success in war is consistency of effort over time. Only experience on the ground permits the acquisition of enough knowledge of the political landscape and personalities necessary to shape events and achieve political stability.

In short, removing such a successful leader from a mission in progress is senseless. It is also inconsistent with much of the America's wartime history.

George Washington served as commander of the American revolutionary forces for eight years, from 1775-1783. Without his resolute leadership and political instincts, it is likely that the Continental Army would have disintegrated.

In the Mexican War, Gen. Winfield Scott led the largest amphibious landing in the history of the U.S., near Vera Cruz. He was then able to achieve operational victory and strategic success by staying on as the military governor in Mexico City.

During World War II, Gens. Dwight D. Eisenhower and George C. Marshall served extended tenures in their respective positions. It would be hard to imagine the military changing these crucial commanders during the war.

Gen. Lucius Clay, initially Gen. Eisenhower's deputy, served for four years in Germany and was instrumental in initiating its reconstruction. With patience and determination, Clay established the foundation for Germany's postwar recovery.

In Korea, Gen. John Hodge served as the commander of U.S. occupying forces in the south from September 1945 to August 1948. While his record was mixed, he spent these years immersed in political infighting, mediating between Korean political factions and sustaining support for the mission in Washington. He helped to create institutions of government strong enough to withstand the invasion from the North, and three years of war.

Gen. Douglas MacArthur oversaw the occupation of Japan for six years from 1945 to 1951. He is credited with transforming the nation into a functioning democracy.

In Vietnam, the pacification policy begun in 1968 by Gen. Creighton Abrams might have achieved success had it begun earlier in the war. Abrams served for four years, integrating civil-military efforts to pacify and reconstruct the country.

Each of these wars represented distinct challenges and the outcomes were varied. Yet the effectiveness of the efforts depended in large measure on the detailed knowledge accrued by commanders, and on their ability to achieve unity of effort within their own teams and between the U.S. command and indigenous leaders. . . .

Indeed, the military's own counterinsurgency (COIN) manual emphasizes the need to cultivate effective leaders in the host country. Younger officers deploying to and from Iraq have reinforced these themes, writing consistently about the importance of maintaining a stable presence and getting to know the political, social and cultural terrain.

This is definitely good news. Petraeus could certainly be valuable in the NATO post because the alliance seems to be falling apart over COIN operations in Afghanistan and NATO command experience would certainly position the general to serve as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. However, as Schadlow's piece points out, stable leadership (and especially effective leadership) is essential to effective COIN ops. Gen. Casey commanded Iraq for nearly three years so I don't see a strategic rationality for making Petraeus move.

CENTCOM would be a much better fit for the general anyway; such a post would still allow Petraeus to influence events in Iraq and Afghanistan and would be a hefty reward for a job well done. However, CENTCOM is currently occupied by ADM. William Fallon, who has been fairly effective and, seemingly, has no plans of retiring. Therefore, the most effective command rotation should leave Petraeus in Iraq until CENTCOM opens up. Any other course seems to drip with political tomfoolery.