A Military Historian Joins the Fight
Great piece by Max Hastings:
Behind the Revolt
The Generals' View: To the Micromanager Goes the Blame
The Washington Post
Wednesday, April 26, 2006; Page A25
The "generals' revolt" against Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld has provoked debate on both sides of the Atlantic about the proper boundaries of military protest. Many people who oppose the Iraq war and deplore Rumsfeld are nonetheless troubled by the notion of senior officers, even retired ones, openly criticizing political leadership.
But in truth, retired soldiers have always been outspoken about the alleged blunders of successor warlords, uniformed and otherwise. During Britain's colonial conflicts and in both world wars, through Korea and Vietnam, hoary old American and British warriors wrote frequently to newspapers, deploring this decision or that, exploiting their credentials to criticize governments and commanders.
During the Iraq campaigns of 1991 and 2003, I heard British chiefs of staff express their fervent desire for veterans to get themselves off television screens. We may assume that, as chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff today, Gen. Peter Pace feels the same way.
Winston Churchill's wartime chief of staff, Gen. Hastings "Pug" Ismay, charmingly described in his memoirs how, in 1940, lunches at his old army club in London became intolerable because at every mouthful, he was beset by veterans explaining how his master should properly be running the war. In self-defense, Ismay resorted to lunching at White's, a venerable aristocratic institution where few members had noticed that a conflict was taking place.
In the past, however, there was a clear demarcation between those issues for which governments were responsible in war -- high policy and the appointment of commanders -- and those of which generals were in charge: field operations. Administrations in the United States and Britain sometimes perished for starting the wrong wars or mismanaging the big issues -- Lyndon Johnson over Vietnam, Britain's Asquith government in 1916. When battles were lost, however, it was generals' heads that rolled, not politicians'.
Full article
Behind the Revolt
The Generals' View: To the Micromanager Goes the Blame
The Washington Post
Wednesday, April 26, 2006; Page A25
The "generals' revolt" against Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld has provoked debate on both sides of the Atlantic about the proper boundaries of military protest. Many people who oppose the Iraq war and deplore Rumsfeld are nonetheless troubled by the notion of senior officers, even retired ones, openly criticizing political leadership.
But in truth, retired soldiers have always been outspoken about the alleged blunders of successor warlords, uniformed and otherwise. During Britain's colonial conflicts and in both world wars, through Korea and Vietnam, hoary old American and British warriors wrote frequently to newspapers, deploring this decision or that, exploiting their credentials to criticize governments and commanders.
During the Iraq campaigns of 1991 and 2003, I heard British chiefs of staff express their fervent desire for veterans to get themselves off television screens. We may assume that, as chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff today, Gen. Peter Pace feels the same way.
Winston Churchill's wartime chief of staff, Gen. Hastings "Pug" Ismay, charmingly described in his memoirs how, in 1940, lunches at his old army club in London became intolerable because at every mouthful, he was beset by veterans explaining how his master should properly be running the war. In self-defense, Ismay resorted to lunching at White's, a venerable aristocratic institution where few members had noticed that a conflict was taking place.
In the past, however, there was a clear demarcation between those issues for which governments were responsible in war -- high policy and the appointment of commanders -- and those of which generals were in charge: field operations. Administrations in the United States and Britain sometimes perished for starting the wrong wars or mismanaging the big issues -- Lyndon Johnson over Vietnam, Britain's Asquith government in 1916. When battles were lost, however, it was generals' heads that rolled, not politicians'.
Full article
posted by Will at 8:13 AM
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