Good news in "The Long War?"
Interesting note from Barnett on Iraq:
Just-in-time strategy for this stop on the Long War
ARTICLE: “U.S. and Iraq Make Inroads With Insurgents,” by Greg Jaffe and Yochi J. Dreazen, Wall Street Journal, 22 June 2006, p. A3.
ARTICLE: “Some Insurgents Are Asking Iraq For Negotiations: Sunni Groups Reach Out; Reconciliation Plan Draws Responses From Factions Said to Be Nationalist,” by Edward Wong, New York Times, 27 June 2006, p. A1.
ARTICLE: “Car Bomb Kills More Than 60 In Iraq Market,” by Edward Wong, New York Times, 2 July 2006, p. A1.
One story I did not clip but only heard on the TV/radio over the past couple of weeks was members of Congress getting mad at an Iraqi proposal for amnesty to insurgents who have killed American soldiers. All I thought at the time was how unrealistic those sorts of demands would be on our part, plus how insulting they could come off to the locals (as in, it’s okay to kill Iraqis and get amnesty but kill an American and that’s that).
But as far as I know that’s a hubbub that comes and goes, since the first article above said that “the only firm line… was that no amnesty would be granted to members of Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia or guerrillas intent on restoring Saddam Hussein’s rule.” That seems reasonable enough.
But beyond all those details, the key thing is that we’re talking directly to insurgent groups, and when I say “we,” I mean both the U.S. forces and the Iraqi government. To the extent that Sunni insurgency factions come in from the cold and we affect a sort of ideological divorce between them and the Saddamists and Salafi jihadists represented by Al Qaeda, this insurgency becomes a whole lot more manageable and ultimately small enough to turn over to the Iraqi forces with the U.S. remaining primarily in the advising role (sort of a purer SysAdmin from above--or behind the scenes).
All of this unfolds with increasingly bold talk from U.S. commanders of reducing troop levels in the fall. With the continuing violence, that seems far-fetched as a hope, but it need not be. Insurgencies ratchet up violence as negotiations such as these mature. We’ve seen this time and time again. The insurgents want to be able to claim that the change achieved was primarily due to their willingness to commit acts of violence. For some, it’s an honor thing, for others, sheer negotiating plank, and for still others eyeing the next fight (like the Al Qaeda guys), there is the need to start building the myth--however far-fetched--that it was their “glorious victory that drove out the invaders” when--in reality--the “invaders” simply shifted the Long War to its next logical stop.
Just-in-time strategy for this stop on the Long War
ARTICLE: “U.S. and Iraq Make Inroads With Insurgents,” by Greg Jaffe and Yochi J. Dreazen, Wall Street Journal, 22 June 2006, p. A3.
ARTICLE: “Some Insurgents Are Asking Iraq For Negotiations: Sunni Groups Reach Out; Reconciliation Plan Draws Responses From Factions Said to Be Nationalist,” by Edward Wong, New York Times, 27 June 2006, p. A1.
ARTICLE: “Car Bomb Kills More Than 60 In Iraq Market,” by Edward Wong, New York Times, 2 July 2006, p. A1.
One story I did not clip but only heard on the TV/radio over the past couple of weeks was members of Congress getting mad at an Iraqi proposal for amnesty to insurgents who have killed American soldiers. All I thought at the time was how unrealistic those sorts of demands would be on our part, plus how insulting they could come off to the locals (as in, it’s okay to kill Iraqis and get amnesty but kill an American and that’s that).
But as far as I know that’s a hubbub that comes and goes, since the first article above said that “the only firm line… was that no amnesty would be granted to members of Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia or guerrillas intent on restoring Saddam Hussein’s rule.” That seems reasonable enough.
But beyond all those details, the key thing is that we’re talking directly to insurgent groups, and when I say “we,” I mean both the U.S. forces and the Iraqi government. To the extent that Sunni insurgency factions come in from the cold and we affect a sort of ideological divorce between them and the Saddamists and Salafi jihadists represented by Al Qaeda, this insurgency becomes a whole lot more manageable and ultimately small enough to turn over to the Iraqi forces with the U.S. remaining primarily in the advising role (sort of a purer SysAdmin from above--or behind the scenes).
All of this unfolds with increasingly bold talk from U.S. commanders of reducing troop levels in the fall. With the continuing violence, that seems far-fetched as a hope, but it need not be. Insurgencies ratchet up violence as negotiations such as these mature. We’ve seen this time and time again. The insurgents want to be able to claim that the change achieved was primarily due to their willingness to commit acts of violence. For some, it’s an honor thing, for others, sheer negotiating plank, and for still others eyeing the next fight (like the Al Qaeda guys), there is the need to start building the myth--however far-fetched--that it was their “glorious victory that drove out the invaders” when--in reality--the “invaders” simply shifted the Long War to its next logical stop.
posted by Will at 6:59 PM
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